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Abstract
Using data for 102 developing countries, it is shown that inflation persistence is particularly
low in countries on hard pegs, and particularly high in countries with severe inflationary
problems. Inflation persistence is similar under floating and soft pegs. The finding of low
inflation persistence in hard pegs is a new result.
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INTRODUCTION
Inflation is well known to display significant persistence – an inflationary shock does not
die away immediately (Fuhrer and Moore, 1995).  Dornbusch (1982) shows that if the
monetary authorities adopt an accommodatory stance by allowing the money supply to
respond more to the price shock, then inflation will be more persistent.  Since floating
exchange rates confer more monetary independence on a country, it is natural to think
that inflationary shocks will be accommodated more under floating rates, and will
therefore be more persistent.
Empirical evidence in favour of this proposition has been provided by Alogoskoufis and
Smith (1991), Alogoskoufis (1992) and Obstfeld (1995).  The evidence offered by these
authors compares persistence estimates for OECD countries over different periods
characterised by different exchange rate regimes.  This evidence has been questioned by
Burdekin and Siklos (1999) on the grounds that shifts in persistence do not particularly
coincide with shifts in exchange rate regime, and in fact appear to reflect other factors
(such as the outbreak of wars).  In addition, Anderton (1997) and Bleaney (2001) show
that, since 1984, inflation persistence has not been any lower in countries that were
members of the European Monetary System than in OECD countries that floated their
exchange rates.
Two further points could be made.  One is that, since the abandonment of the Gold
Standard, pegs have been to another currency rather than to gold, so that importing the
inflation persistence of the anchor currency through pegging does not necessarily mean
reducing it (Bleaney, 2001).  The other point is that, if there are few obstacles to
devaluation, a peg may not be characterised by significantly less monetary
accommodation than a float.  To address the first point, it seems most appropriate to
focus on data from a period when monetary accommodation has been low.  This has been
particularly the case since about 1980, when monetary authorities in the OECD countries
began to recognise that a tough response to inflation shocks was necessary to keep
inflationary expectations down (Clarida et al., 1998).  To cater for the second point, it is
desirable to include countries on different types of peg.  Some pegs offer much more
serious obstacles to devaluation than others.  Adoption of the currency of another country
(dollarisation), the establishment of legally enforced automatic mechanisms for
tightening monetary policy in response to losses of foreign exchange reserves (currency
boards), and sharing a currency with other countries whose agreement is required for a
devaluation (as in the African Financial Community) can all be described as “hard” pegs
where devaluation is much more difficult or even impossible.  Since there are no
examples of such hard pegs amongst the OECD countries (at least until the creation of
the euro), the focus of this paper is on developing countries.  This differentiates our work
from previous research, which has focused on OECD economies.
1. SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY
We use annual data for 102 developing countries (excluding transition economies) from
1984 to 2000, as listed in the Appendix.  Our inflation measure is the change in the log of
the consumer price index from one calendar year to the next (p), transformed as
2[p/(1+p)], so as to avoid too much distortion from outlying high observations (the
transformed index has a maximum of one).  Inflation persistence is estimated as the
parameter a in the following regression:
pit = apit-1 + ei + ut + vit (1)
where e represents a country fixed effect and u a time fixed effect, countries being
indexed by i and time by t, and v is an error term.  We present estimates of a from (1) and
also from a modified version with ut omitted (i.e. without time fixed effects).
The sample is split by exchange rate regime, which is observed on 31 December of each
year.  The IMF’s official classifications of exchange rate regimes are aggregated into
three categories as follows (IMF classifications in parentheses – for more details see
XXXX, 2003):
Hard Pegs (No Separate Legal Tender, Currency Board);
Soft Pegs (Peg to a Single Currency, Peg to a Composite of Currencies, Crawling Pegs
and Bands, Limited Flexibility);
Floats (Managed Floating, Independently Floating).
For an observation to be included, the exchange rate regime must be the same on 31
December of year t and year t-1.
We also split the sample into countries defined as having experienced severe inflationary
problems, and the remainder.  “Severe inflationary problems” are defined as an average
inflation rate of over 25 % p.a. throughout the period, or at least one year in which
inflation exceeded 170 %.  The countries in this category are listed in the Appendix.
2. RESULTS
Table 1 shows the results.  Taking the sample as a whole (the top part of the table),
inflation persistence appears quite high – between 0.5 and 0.6 for both floats and pegs,
whether or not the equation allows for year effects.  When pegs are split into hard pegs
and soft pegs, however, dramatic differences appear.  The estimate of inflation
persistence is approaching 0.7 for soft pegs, but below 0.21 for hard pegs.  Moreover
persistence is significantly (positively) correlated with inflation for soft pegs and floats. 
Omitting countries with severe inflationary problems reduces the estimates of inflation
persistence considerably (other than for hard pegs), to below 0.4 for floats and about 0.3
for all pegs.  For soft pegs it brings the estimate down to just above 0.4, although the
difference in coefficients between hard and soft pegs is still statistically significant.
Omitting high-inflation countries also eliminates the correlation between inflation
persistence and the level of inflation, except when all pegs are combined (which is
explained by the fact that hard pegs have both lower average inflation and lower inflation
persistence).  The countries with severe inflationary problems have very high inflation
persistence (above 0.75), as is shown by the last line in the table.  One reason for this
may be that high inflation was much more of a problem in the 1980s than the 1990s, so
that in many of these countries there has in effect been a structural break in the inflation
process.  By not allowing for this, the specification biases upwards the estimate of
inflation persistence for these countries.
3We have also tested whether inflation persistence varies with per capita GDP, openness
and size of country as measured by population.  The results were always negative after
allowing for the factors described above.
3. CONCLUSIONS
It is not clear that soft pegs offer much of an obstacle to the monetary accommodation of
inflationary shocks, because devaluations can be frequent.  Our results show that inflation
persistence is much the same under soft pegs as under floating.  It is significantly lower
under hard pegs (currency boards or a shared currency), where the scope for monetary
accommodation of inflation shocks is much reduced.
REFERENCES
Alogoskoufis, G.S., 1992. Monetary accommodation, exchange rate regimes and inflation
persistence, Economic Journal 102, pp. 461-80.
Alogoskoufis, G.S. and Smith, R.P., 1991. The Phillips curve, the persistence of inflation,
and the Lucas critique: evidence from exchange-rate regimes, American Economic
Review 81, pp. 1254-1275.
Anderton, R., 1997. Did the underlying behaviour of inflation change in the 1980s? A
study of 17 countries, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 133, pp. 22-38.
Bleaney, M.F., 2001. Exchange rate regimes and inflation persistence, IMF Staff Papers
47, pp. 387-402.
Burdekin, R.C. and Siklos, P., 1999. Exchange rate regimes and shifts in inflation
persistence: does nothing else matter? Journal of Money Credit and Banking 31, pp. 235-
247.
Clarida, R., Galí, J. and Gertler, M., 1998. Monetary policy rules in practice: some
international evidence, European Economic Review 42, pp. 1033-1067.
Dornbusch, R., 1982.  PPP exchange rate rules and macroeconomic stability, Journal of
Political Economy 90, pp. 158-165.
Fuhrer, J. and Moore, G., 1995. Inflation persistence, Quarterly Journal of Economics
110, pp 127-159.
Obstfeld, M., 1995. International currency experience: new lessons and lessons relearned,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, pp. 119-220.
XXXX, 2003. Exchange rate regimes and inflation: only hard pegs make a difference,
Discussion Paper no. 03/15, XXXX.
4Appendix
Countries included in the sample (*on hard peg for some or all of the time; 
# with severe inflationary problems):
Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda*, Argentina*#, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin*,
Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil#, Burkina Faso*, Cameroon*, Cape Verde, Central African
Republic*, Chad*, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo#,
Republic of Congo*, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire*, Djibouti*, Dominica*, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador#, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea*, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon*,
Gambia, Ghana#, Grenada*, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau*#, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Laos#, Liberia, Libya,
Madagascar, Maldives, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali*, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico#,
Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua#, Niger*, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama*,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru#, Philippines, Rwanda, St. Lucia*, St. Vincent and
Grenadines*, São Tomé and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal*, Seychelles, Sierra Leone#,
Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan#, Suriname#, Swaziland,
Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo*, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey#, Uganda#,
Uruguay#, Vanuatu, Venezuela#, Vietnam, Zambia#, Zimbabwe.
5Table 1.  Inflation Persistence Estimates for Different Samples
Regime Sample Size With year effects Without year effects
Persistence
coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
correlated
with
inflation?
Persistence
coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
correlated
with
inflation?
Floating 493 0.556
(15.2)
No 0.596
(17.2)
Yes
All pegs 806 0.558
(17.4)
Yes 0.547
(17.1)
Yes
Soft pegs
only
544 0.678
(17.7)
Yes 0.693
(18.5)
Yes
Hard pegs
only
260 0.151
(2.52)
No 0.209
(3.48)
No
Omitting countries with severe inflationary problems
Floating 336 0.284
(5.43)
No 0.381
(7.55)
No
All pegs 722 0.307
(17.4)
Yes 0.309
(8.22)
Yes
Soft pegs
only
473 0.401
(8.55)
No 0.436
(9.48)
No
Hard pegs
only
249 0.155
(2.35)
No 0.208
(3.29)
No
Countries with severe inflationary problems
All 268 0.764
(17.7)
No 0.818
(20.7)
No
Notes.  Estimates refer to the parameter a in equation (1).  See text for definition of
regimes and severe inflationary problems.  Where the persistence coefficient is correlated
with inflation the correlation is always positive.
